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TAXATION
During the survey period, West Virginia law with respect to taxation was
simultaneously undergoing both extensive study by the West Virginia Tax
Study Commission' and significant changes such as the beginning of im-
plementation of the Property Tax Limitation and Homestead Exemption
Amendment of 1982.2 Other changes were wrought by decisions of the West
Virginia Supreme .Court of Appeals with respect to municipal service fees
and Carrier Income Tax application. The court also dealt with property tax
and business and occupation tax issues during the survey period.
I. MUNICIPAL SERVICE FEES
Hare v. City of Wheeling, 298 S.E.2d 820 (W. Va. 1982).
City of Fairmont v. Pitrolo Pontiac-Cadillac Co., 308 S.E.2d 527 (W. Va. 1983).
The taxation decisions of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
during the survey period which have caused the most significant public con-
troversy and elicited the greatest reaction from the affected parties were
Hare v. City of Wheeling3 and City of Fairmont v. Pitrolo Pontiac-Cadillac
Co." These decisions appear to be a reversal of previous holdings' which
authorized the imposition by municipalities of certain user fees based on the
value of property under the West Virginia Code.
6
In Hare, the court held that a Wheeling municipal police service fee
which was tied to the value of property in the city was an ad valorem7 pro-
' WEST VIRGINIA TAX STUDY COMMISSION, INTERIM REPORT TO THE WEST VIRGINIA STATE
LEGISLATURE, A TAX SYSTEM FOR WEST VIRGINIA IN THE 1980's (Jan. 1983) (available from the Tax
Study Commission) [hereinafter cited as W. VA. TAX STUDY]. The West Virginia Tax Study Com-
mission was created by House Concurrent Resolution No. 18 of the West Virginia State
Legislature on March 13, 1982. The resolution mandated the Tax Study Commission to "recom-
mend improvements in our state tax structure and related improvements in the structure of
political subdivisions of the state .... Id. at 7. The final report of the commission will be sub-
mitted to the legislature in January of 1984.
2 W. VA. CONST. art X, § lb. Though the West Virginia Legislature has not yet enacted laws
to fully implement the amendment, the amendment itself mandates a reappraisal of all real pro-
perty in West Virginia. The tax commissioner has begun that reappraisal.
298 S.E.2d 820 (W. Va. 1982).
308 S.E.2d 527 (W. Va. 1983).
The court in McCoy v. City of Sistersville, 120 W. Va. 471, 199 S.E. 260 (1938), upheld the
imposition of a fire service fee based on property value. In City of Charleston v. Board of Educ.,
209 S.E.2d 55, 57 (W. Va. 1974), the court characterized a value-based fire service fee as a user fee
and not a tax. The court in Hare, 298 S.E.2d at 825 n.7, dismissed these holdings as irrelevant
since the particular issue of the conflict between the fees and the limitation amendment was not
directly considered in those cases.
6 W. VA. CODE § 8-13-13 (1976) provides in part as follows:
Notwithstanding any charter provisions to the contrary, every municipality which fur-
nishes any essential or special municipal service, including, but not limited to, police and
fire protection .... shall have plenary power and authority to provide by ordinance for
the installation, continuance, maintenance, or improvement of any such service, to make
1
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perty tax subject to the restrictions of the Tax Limitation Amendment of
1932.8 Similarly, Pitrolo determined that a Fairmont fire service fee charged
against the owners of buildings in relation to the value of those buildings was
also unconstitutional for the same reason.' Both municipal ordinances were
held to violate section 1 of article X of the Constitution of West Virginia
because each city had already exhausted its maximum property taxing
authority allowed under the amendment." These decisions disallowed a major
source of revenue for a significant number of municipalities in West
Virginia.11
The court recognized the distinction between a user fee and a property
tax. A user fee is a direct charge for a specific service collected from those
who benefit from the service.2 A property tax is a levy which is not related
to benefits conferred, but instead is tied to the value of property." The court
rejected the argument in both cases that the municipal fees in question were
user fees by concentrating on the clear evidence that the amount of the fees
was ad valorem, that is, according to value.14 Both Hare and Pitrolo rest
heavily on an unstated assumption that an ad valorem basis necessarily
makes a municipal fee an ad valorem tax.15 The court did not take notice of
reasonable regulations with respect thereto, and to impose by ordinance upon the users
of such service reasonable rates, fees and charges to be collected in the manner specified
in the ordinance ....
Ad Valorem means according to value. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 52 (5th ed. 1979).
298 S.E.2d at 826. W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1 sets limits on the maximum levels of
property taxation which may be imposed on each of four classes of property in West
Virginia. The amendment provides in part:
[T]he aggregate of taxes assessed in any one year upon personal property.., shall
not exceed fifty cents on each one hundred dollars of value thereon and upon all prop-
erty owned, used and occupied by the owner thereof exclusively for residential purposes
and upon farms occupied and cultivated by their owners or bona fide tenants one dollar;
and upon all other property situated outside of municipalities, one dollar and fifty cents;
and upon all other such property situated within municipalities, two dollars ....
308 S.E.2d at 532.
,o Id.; 298 S.E.2d at 826.
" At least 46 municipalities in West Virginia now impose police protection fees and 49 im-
pose fire protection fees though the exact number which use an ad valorem basis is not stated. W.
VA. TAX STUDY, supra note 1 at 33.
,I W. VA. CODE § 8-13-13 (1976).
13 308 S.E.2d at 529.
" Id. at 530-31, the court cites extensive authorities which distinguish taxes and fees. In
McCoy, 199 S.E.2d at 264, the court found:
We are unable to accept as sound the argument advanced that the word "users" be
given a meaning under which a special class of property owners are laid under a burden
which in all fairness, should be bourne by all alike in proportion to property valuation
under general taxation.
'1 308 S.E.2d at 531-33. In Hare the court states: "We hold that where certain ordinances of
the city of Wheeling impose upon owners of property a police service charge based upon the value
1984]
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the possible existence of a hybrid class of fees which might be labeled ad
valorem fees: user fees in which the direct benefits conferred upon the user
of a service are directly proportional to the value of the user's property
benefited by the service.16
The court's heavy emphasis in these decisions on the ad valorem nature
of the charges levied against property owners has led municipalities around
the state to quickly attempt to fashion new service fees on property owners.
These newly designed fees do not rely on property valuation but on some
other factors more closely related to the level of service provided, such as a
square footage basis for a fire service fee.17
When the court is given the opportunity to rule on these new fee struc-
tures, it may find these fees to be reasonably related to the services provided
and therefore bona fide fees not subject to the Tax Limitation Amendment.
Such a decision would represent a retreat from the holdings of Hare and
Pitrolo. The more likely result is that the court will again judge these fees by
their operation and effect and not by their labels.18 When a municipality has
exhausted its ad valorem taxing authority on property, any additional pro-
perty tax, even though not itself based on value, would necessarily cause the
total property tax burden to exceed the permissible limits. The crucial ques-
tion, then, is not whether a charge on property is ad valorem, but whether it
is a tax or a user fee.
A distinction between user fees and property taxes which was not ad-
dressed in either case relates not to the ad valorem nature of the assessment,
but to the basic character of the service supported by the charge. User fees
charged against property owners must be related to special benefits to the
property,19 while property taxes may be used for general governmental ex-
penses. In State ex rel. City of Huntington v. Heffley,0 the court held that a
of property... such ordinances impose, in fact, an ad valorem tax upon property." 298 S.E.2d at
826.
16 Though not labeled as ad valorem fees by the court, the fire service charges in dispute in
McCoy and Charleston were treated as if such a hybrid class of fees existed.
"' Sutton v. City of Parkersburg, No. 83-C-306 (Cir. Ct. Wood County Apr. 14, 1983). This is
the first test of a square footage based fire fee to reach the courts. Here the court held the square
footage system of Parkerburg Ord. 781.01-05 to be a user fee and not an ad valorem tax, though an
exemption for churches and other non-profit organizations was disallowed as being contrary to
uniformity requirements.
The City of Morgantown has also proposed a new fire service fee based solely on square
footage of buildings in the city. A prior proposed ordinance would have apportioned fire service
fees on the basis of a complicated rate system combining gallons per minute of water flow and in-
surance rating factors. That proposed rate system was rejected by Morgantown City Council. In-
terview with Willard Lorensen, member of Morgantown Fire Fee Task Force (Sept. 2, 1983).
" 308 S.E.2d at 529.
, See State ex rel. City of Huntington v. Heffley, 127 W. Va. 254, 268, 32 S.E.2d 456, 463
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municipal fee for a purpose which benefits the community as a whole cannot
be viewed as a special benefit to property within the municipality. Should the
court accept this distinction between fees and taxes, it must invalidate any
fees levied against property for support of general governmental services
where the tax limitation has been reached. Though labeled as a fee, such a
charge would clearly be a tax subject to the Limitation Amendment. The
court would have to characterize police and fire services as special benefits
to property in order to escape this dilemma.
Even if the court is able to avoid the apparent inherent conflict between
the Tax Limitation Amendment and municipal ordinances which place the
costs of police and fire protection on property owners, the court will still be
faced with the issue of uniformity of application of fees,' an issue it was not
required to address in Hare or Pitrolo. Further, there may well also be a fun-
damental federal constitutional prohibitation of such non-uniform fees. The
United States Supreme Court, in Norwood v. Baker,' dealt with special
assessments on property. The Court held that:
[t]he exaction from the owner of private property of the cost of a public im-
provement in substantial excess of the special benefits accruing to him is, to
the extent of such excess, a taking under the guise of taxation of private pro-
perty for public use without compensation.'
This prohibition as it relates to special assessments against property has
been consistently followed in other jurisdictions.24 Therefore, this "taking"
issue may serve to prohibit the imposition of special user fees on property
owners for support of general governmental services such as police and fire
protection.
West Virginia's Tax Limitation Amendment is at loggerheads with the
very real and urgent needs of municipalities for revenues to support vital
services such as police and fire protection. Now that the court has recognized
the existence of this fundamental conflict, it is difficult to see how it can be
satisfactorily resolved short of either drastic reductions in municipal services
or a change in the West Virginia Constitution. The court may in fact be in-
directly suggesting that the Tax Limitation Amendment of 1932 is fundamen-
tally incompatible with the needs of modern local governments. By its deci-
2, 298 S.E.kd at 822-23. Appellants argued that W. VA. CODE § 8-13-13 does not allow for some
users, but not all users of police service to be liable for user fees. However, the court did not need
to address this issue since the case was decided on constitutional grounds.
Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269 (1898).
Id. at 279.
See Buettner v. City of St. Cloud, 277 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1979); Furey v. City of Sacramen-
to, 24 Cal. 3d 862, 598 P.2d 844, 157 Cal. Rptr. 684, appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 976 (1979); Briar
West, Inc. v. City of Lincoln, 206 Neb. 172, 291 N.W.2d 730 (1980). Though Norwood and these
cases refer to special assessments used to pay for various public improvements, it may be
analogized to a special user fee against property used to support general governmental services.
1984]
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sions the court may be creating pressure for a change in the state's basic
property taxation system.2
II. CARRIER INCOME TAX
C & P Telephone Co. v. Rose, 307 S.E.2d 620 (W. Va. 1983).
C & P Telephone v. Rose 2' represents a reversal of the court's recent
trend toward expanding the limits of applicability of the Gross Carrier In-
come Tax.' The court reversed a decision of the Circuit Court of Kanawha
County, which had issued a deficiency judgment against the company in the
amount of $6,591,687.94. This represented the tax on C & P's receipts for
transmission of interstate telephone calls through its West Virginia lines.28
C & P Telephone Company of West Virginia is an independent company with
all of its facilities located within the State of West Virginia. It is a subsidiary
of American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T), which is affilitated
with the twenty-two other AT&T subsidiaries throughout the United
States
Justice Neely, writing for the court, did not find it necessary to reach the
commerce clause and due process issues which usually dominate these types
of interstate commerce cases. 0 Instead, this case was decided purely on the
basis of construction of the meaning of the taxing statute."1 The court held
I The court's decision in Killen v. County Comm'n, 295 S.E.2d 689 (W. Va. 1982), which re-
quired assessments on true and actual value of property, would have caused a similar effect on the
property tax system had it not been essentially nullified by the Property Tax Limitation and
Homestead Exemption Amendment of 1982.
307 S.E.2d 620 (W. Va. 1983).
' W. VA. CODE § 11-12A-2 (Supp. 1983) provides:
Every motor vehicle carrier operating on the public highways of this State and every
railroad car carrier, express company, pipeline company, telephone and telegraph com-
pany, airline company and any person operating a steamboat or other watercraft, for the
transportation of passengers or freight, doing business in the State shall pay to the
State an annual tax for each calender year. This tax shall be equal to the gross income
from all business beginning and ending within the state multiplied by the respective
rates as follows: ....
Western Md. Ry. v. Goodwin, 282 S.E.2d 240 (W. Va. 1981), appeal dismissed, 456 U.S. 952 (1982),
imposed the Carrier Income Tax on switching fees and demurrage income from railway cars mov-
ing in interstate commerce. West Virginia Motor Delivery Co. v. Goodwin, decided in the same
opinion, imposed the Carrier Income Tax on the trucking charge for delivery of meats to West
Virginia customers which had been shipped from out of state.
For a comprehensive treatment of the court's recent decisions with respect to the Carrier In-
come Tax, see Lathrop, Due Process and Commerce Clause Considerations under West Virginia
Business and Occupation and Carrier Income Taxes-J. C. Penny to Milacron, 85 W. VA. L. Rav.
307 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Lathrop].
307 S.E.2d at 621.
2 Id.
o See Lathrop, supra note 27.
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that the company's receipts for carrying interstate calls was not income from
business "beginning and ending within the state."32
The court based this ruling on two factors. First, Neely pointed out a
unique technical characteristic of interstate phone calls, namely that no
business transaction occurs unless someone in another state picks up a phone
to complete a connection. This out-of-state transaction (picking up the phone)
is absolutely required for a transaction to occur. Therefore, Neely concluded,
that such business activity cannot begin and end in West Virginia.3 Second,
Neely found the method by which C & P is reimbursed for its interstate ser-
vice to be a crucial factor. C & P is paid a set percentage of all interstate
phone revenues of AT&T. The court held that this fact separates the com-
pany's income from direct connection to its in-state activities. 4
Both of these rationales are confusing at best, since the company's
facilities are completely within the state and all its services are performed in-
side the state. Neely asserted in his opinion that the use of this statutory
phrase to decide the case will free taxing authorities and taxpayers alike
"from the necessity of engaging in nebulous, even metaphysical analysis"35 of
interstate taxing issues. However, this new standard may create more ques-
tions than it answers.
While the Complete Auto test" and its subsequent interpretations pro-
vide an established framework for analysis of the permissible limits of taxa-
tion of interstate commerce, the court proposed the use of a bare definition.
Business beginning and ending within West Virginia is that which is a
"separate, distinct, time-consuming operation and not incidental to the in-
terstate movement of goods."37
This definition, which, unlike Complete Auto, has had no extensive inter-
pretation, provides little basis on which to predict the outcome of future
307 S.E.2d at 624.
Id. The court seems to be defining business very broadly to include the out of state com-
ponents of an interstate telephone transmission rather than confining the meaning of business to
those parts of the transaction handled by C & P of West Virginia. The breadth of the definition
thus determined the outcome of the case.
1 Id. This requirement that there be a direct relationship between the business beginning
and ending in West Virginia and the method of payment for the business transacted is a new con-
cept. The fact that part of the interstate phone revenues paid to C & P may have originated in
another state is held to be a dispositive factor by the court.
Id. at 623.
A tax on interstate commerce can be applied to an activity "with a substantial nexus with
a taxing State, [be] fairly apportioned ... not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [be]
fairly related to the services provided by the State." Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430
U.S. 274, 279 (1979).
1, 307 S.E.2d at 623 (quoting Western Md Ry., 282 S.E.2d at 247).
1984]
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disputes over Carrier Income Tax liability in West Virginia as long as the
current statute remains unchanged."
The most likely result of the C & P Telephone case is that the legislature
will be encouraged at its earliest opportunity to modify the language of the
statute to extend its coverage to the limits of constitutional boundaries. This
case would seem to indicate, however, that the court, even in the face of a
changed statute, may be disposed to embark on a period of contracting rather
than expanding the applicability of the Carrier Income Tax. There is no in-
dication as yet however that this change of direction will also spill over into
the Business and Occupation Tax arena.
III. BUSINESS AND OCCUPATION TAX
Hydraulics, Inc. v. Dailey, 301 S.E.2d 605 (W. Va. 1983).
Williams and Co., Inc. v. Dailey, 303 S.E.2d 737 (W. Va. 1983).
Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 303 S.E.2d 706 (W. Va. 1983).
Teavee Oil and Gas, Inc. v. Hardesty, 297 S.E.2d 898 (W. Va. 1982).
During the survey period, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
continued to use the same analysis of commerce clause and due process
clause challenges to the Business and Occupation Tax on interstate businesses
which it has used since J. C. Penny Co., Inc. v. Hardesty.9 The court con-
tinued to apply the Complete Auto test, 0 while virtually ignoring that prong
of the test which requires that the tax be fairly apportioned among the states
involved in the subject business transaction giving rise to the taxable in-
come.
41
In Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty,2 the Tax Commissioner appealed a ruling of
the Circuit Court of Kanawha County which had held that certain divisions of
Armco, Inc. were not subject to West Virginia's Business and Occupation
Tax." Armco is an Ohio corporation with four separate divisions, each of
which conducts business in West Virginia. While Armco's mining division has
a substantial presence in the state, both with respect to local employees and
local facilities, the other three divisions have no such in-state contacts."
Williams and Co., Inc. v. Dailey5 involved a similar situtation. Williams and
Co., Inc. is a Pennsylvania corporation which has three branch stores in West
' Id. at 624-25. The court clearly states that the "beginning and ending" test has a narrower
spectrum than the constitutionally permissible Complete Auto test.
264 S.E.2d 604 (W. Va. 1980). See also Lathrop, supra note 27 for a discussion of the case.
430 U.S. at 279.
"Id.
303 S.E.2d 706 (V. Va. 1983), cert. granted, 52 U.S.L.W. 3449 (Dec. 12, 1983) (No. 83-297).
's Id. at 708.
" Id. at 708-09.
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Virginia. It also makes sales directly from the company's Pittsburgh office.
Only the business and occupation tax on sales from the Pittsburgh office
were at issue in the case. As in Armco, the Circuit Court of Kanawha County
had ruled that the sales of the Pittsburgh division were not subject to
Business and Occupation Tax. 6
In both Armco and Williams, the court looked at each company's total
operations in West Virginia as a single unitary business, even though each
company operated separate independent divisions within West Virginia. The
use of the unitary business concept resulted almost by definition in a finding
of a sufficient nexus between each company and the state." Justice Miller
cited substantial authority in support of the use of the unitary business con-
cept to establish the required nexus to support taxation. When the court
turned to consideration of the apportionment prong of the Complete Auto
test, the analysis weakened considerably.
The opinion cites the state's varying rates of Business and Occupation
Tax on different types of business activity as an indication of fair apportion-
ment, but this in-state apportionment of the tax burden has no relationship
to apportionment of the tax base among the states involved. Justice Miller
found that the total West Virginia receipts of each company were properly a
part of the West Virginia tax base." Unlike previous decisions in which the
self-apportionment nature of the Business and Occupation Tax was simply
summarily stated," he did provide some support for this holding from other
jurisdictions, but the cited cases all deal with two rather specialized types of
business income: travel agency and leasing.2
In Hydraulics, Inc. v. Dailey,' the court found justification for taxing the
4 Id. at 738-39.
'T 303 S.E.2d at 714.
4 Id. at 709-14.
"9 Id. at 714. The court seems to confuse and combine the Complete Auto requirements of fair
apportionment of the tax base among the states with fair relationship of the tax to the services
provided by the state. The varying B & 0 rates indicate only a fair relationship between the tax
charged and the value of services provided by the state.
303 S.E.2d at 716.
5, See, e.g., J.C. Penney Co. v. Hardesty, 264 S.E.2d 604, 610; Cincinnati Milacron Co. v.
Hardesty, 290 S.E.2d 902, 904 (W. Va. 1982).
1 The court cited three cases involving the rather specialized situation involving commis-
sions of travel agents from selling tours and accomodations in out-of-state locations: Ramsey
Travel, Inc. v. Kondo, 53 Haw. 419, 495 P.2d 1172 (1972), appeal dismissed, 410 U.S. 949 (1973);
McKinnis Travel Service, Inc. v. Washington, 78 Wash.2d 229, 472 P.2d 392 (1970); Pan American
World Airways, Inc. v. Virgin Islands, 459 F.2d 387 (3d Cir. 1972); and only three other cases, In re
Heftel Broadcasting Honolulu, Inc. 57 Haw. 175, 554 P.2d 242 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1073
(1977); In re Grayco Land Escrow Ltd., 57 Haw. 436, 559 P.2d 264, cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977);
Collector of Revenue v. Wells Fargo Leasing Corp., 393 So.2d 1244 (La. 1981).
Hydraulics, Inc. v. Dailey, 301 S.E.2d 605 (W. Va. 1983).
1984]
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sale of replacement parts to out-of-state customers when those sales are in-
cidental to mining repair services performed in West Virginia. This case
dealt with the tax liability of two West Virginia mining machinery repair
companies, Hydraulics, Inc. and Morgantown Machine and Hydraulics, Inc."8
Both companies had received a favorable ruling from the Circuit Court of
Kanawha County exempting them from payment of Business and Occupation
Tax on the sale of parts to out-of-state customers.' These companies picked
up the machinery from out of state, brought it to West Virginia for repair,
and delivered the machinery back to the out-of-state customers."6
While sales to out-of-state customers are normally not subject to the
Business and Occupation Tax, the fact that the sale of the replacement parts
was inextricably intertwined with the in-state servicing of mining machines
was held to subject the entire income from sales and service to the Business
Occupation Tax. 7
Unlike the court's apparent change of attitude toward the Carrier Income
Tax, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has evidently decided to
continue extending the tax on businesses involved in interstate commerce to
the outer limits of constitutionality. It appears that the only way for such
businesses to avoid the tax on their total West Virginia cross-company
receipts will be to prove multiple taxation.
The court also considered the effect of administrative regulations under
the Business and Occupation Tax on natural gas production. Justice Neely
wrote the opinion for the court in Teavee Oil and Gas Company, Inc. v.
Hardesty,' which upheld the State Tax Commissioner's disallowal of the
method of valuation of natural gas production used by the taxpayer. Teavee
Oil and Gas, Inc. paid Business and Occupation Taxes based on the average
purchase price of gas at the well head as authorized by alternative (b) of the
Commissioner's regulations. 9 The Tax Commissioner ruled that the value
should be determined by alternative (c) which allows use of the gross sales
price of the gas less a fifteen percent allowance for transportation costs.
The court reasoned that the intent of the Legislature was to tax natural
gas production based on its true and actual value." The court held that
I Id. at 606.
SId.
5Id.
5' Id. at 608.
Teavee Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Hardesty, 297 S.E.2d 898 (W. Va. 1982).
5 Id. at 899, referring to BOT Regs. § 1.2a(F)(2)(b).
Id., referring to BOT Regs. § 1.2a(F)(2)(c).
61 Id. at 900. The court stated, "[o]bviously it was the intention of the Legislature to tax true
and actual value, and the tax commissioner's regulations are designed to establish reasonably con-
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whichever alternative method of valuation set out in the regulations most
nearly approximates the true and actual value must be used.2 This ruling
means that a taxpayer may not, at least with the Business and Occupation
Tax on natural gas production, follow the common taxpayer practice of using
those alternative tax regulations which tend to minimize tax liability. 3
IV. PROPERTY TAXES
In re Tax Assessments Against Pocahontas Land Co., 303 S.E.2d 691 (W. Va.
1983).
Cook v. Duncan, 301 S.E.2d 837 (W. Va. 1983).
During the survey period, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
clarified several procedures related to property assessment challenges
before county commissions acting as boards of equalization and review in In
re Tax Assessments Against Pocahontas Land Co."5 The court also clarified
the procedures required to perfect title under a tax deed in Cook v. Duncan.6 6
The importance of a clear definition of board of equalization and review
procedures has increased with the passage of the Property Tax Limitation
and Homestead Exemption Amendment of 1982.7 This amendment mandates
the reappraisal of all real property in West Virginia by 1985. The boards will
be the forums in which all challenges to the new appraisals must be
initiated.' The procedural questions addressed in Pocahontas Land, along
with previous decisions defining the role and procedures of the boards, 9 will
help establish the procedural framework for the many disputes which will
certainly arise from so massive a property reappraisal program.
In Pocahontas Land a group of McDowell County taxpayers0 challenged
the assessment of surface property owned by the Pocahontas Land Company
by presenting to the county board of equalization and review a petition for in-
creased assessment. While the board officially rejected the petition, it pro-
G2 Id.
I It is likely that the Tax Commissioner's regulations were promulgated at a time when
natural gas prices were fairly stable and the recent rapid increases in prices, which caused a wide
divergence in the results of using different alternative calculations, were not contemplated.
" The functions and procedures of the boards of equalization and review are set out in W.
VA. CODE § 11-3-24 (Supp. 1983).
In re Tax Assessments Against Pocahontas Land Co., 303 S.E.2d 691 (W. Va. 1983).
CS Cook v. Duncan, 301 S.E.2d 837 (W. Va. 1983).
0 W. VA. CONST. art. X, § lb.
W. VA. CODE § 11-3-25 (1974).
CS See Kemp v. Boyd, 275 S.E.2d 297 (W. Va. 1981); Consolidation Coal Co. v. Krupica, 254
S.E.2d 813 (W. Va. 1979); Tug Valley Recovery Center, Inc., v. County Comm'n, 261 S.E.2d 165 (W.
Va. 1979).
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ceeded to announce its intention to increase the assessment of all Class III
surface property to $300 per acre.1' Pocahontas Land Co. requested and was
granted a hearing which was conceded by all parties to have been "rather
chaotic." After the hearing the board ordered the assessments increased, but
the board's decision was reversed by the circuit court.2
I
The taxpayers who originally petitioned for the increased assessment of
the company's land appealed to the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals,73 which affirmed the lower court's ruling. The court affirmed on two
grounds: first, that a quorum of the board of equalization and review must be
present during a hearing for its decision based on that hearing to be valid;"
and second, that the board may not consider data or evidence other than that
presented at the formal hearing on a question of disputed assessment. 5 In
this case, only one of the three board members was present for the hearing.
Further, no evidence was presented at the hearing in support of increased
assessments.
The court also provided some guidance for future disputes with respect
to notice requirements and the time restraints on board of equalization and
review action. Justice Miller wrote that a defective published legal notice re-
quired by the West Virginia Code78 can be cured by either direct notice to the
affected landowners by registered mail or by the mere appearance of the
landowner at a board hearing on the issue in controversy.7 Any claim to in-
adequacy of notice is thus waived by an appearance before the board.
As to time restraints on board action,78 the court's decision sanctioned
the expansion beyond twenty-eight days of the time allowed for the board to
complete its work. The court's decision suggested that the board may begin
its review and corrections to entries on the land books before its first official
7' 303 S.E.2d at 694.
72 Id.
71 Id. at 695. The court decided that the group of taxpayers had standing to pursue an appeal
even though they were not directly involved in the board's formal hearing on the assessment in-
crease.
7' 303 S.E.2d at 699.
" Id. at 699-701.
71 W. VA. CODE § 11-3-24 (Supp. 1983) provides:
When it is desired to increase the entire valuation in any one district by a general in-
crease, notice shall be given by publication thereof as a Class 11-0 legal advertisement....
The date of the last publication shall be at least five days prior to the increase in valua-
tion.
303 S.E.2d at 698.
7' The relevant portion of W. VA. CODE § 11-3-24 (Supp. 1983), is:
The county commission shall annually not later than the first day of February, meet for
the purpose of reviewing and equalizing the assessment made by the assessor. It shall
not adjourn for longer than three days at a time until this work is completed, and shall
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meeting. These actions are purely administrative functions which need not be
part of the public hearings process. 9 Miller also intimated, based on case law
from other jurisdictions," that the board's meetings may extend beyond
twenty-eight days. Such an extension would be allowed if required to com-
plete hearings which are in progress but uncompleted as of midnight of the
twenty-eighth day. 1 The exact parameters of this time extension are not
made clear.
The court also dealt with procedural questions in Cook v. Duncan,82
where the proper procedures for perfecting title through a tax deed were at
issue.83 The court held that a purchaser at a tax sale must comply literally
with all statutory requirements in order to obtain good title to such
property. 4 Appellant Cook had failed to pay property taxes due for the sec-
ond half of the 1975 tax year on three lots located in Harper's Ferry." Ap-
pellee Duncan purchased the lots at a tax sale in 1976 and was issued a tax
deed by the county clerk of Jefferson County in May of 1978."6 Cook was un-
successful in having the tax deed set aside at the circuit court level and thus
filed this appeal.
The delinquent taxpayer in this case was entitled to have a tax deed set
aside on three separate grounds: (1) that the county clerk failed to use due
diligence in ascertaining the residence of the delinquent taxpayer so that a
notice of right to redeem could be sent to the address most likely to effect ac-
tual notification;88 (2) that merely filing a copy of a subdivision plat contain-
ing a description of the subject property fails to meet the explicit re-
quirements of the Code,89 since an actual new survey by a competent
surveyor at the buyer's expense is required;"0 and (3) that the county clerk
failed to commence publication of notice within the statutory period."
The Cook holding demonstrates the court's continuing respect for the
rights of landowners and its attendant reluctance to allow the dispossession
of a delinquent property owner should that person appear and contest the is-
303 S.E.2d at 700.
Id. at 701. See, e.g., Universal Consol. Oil Co. v. Bryam, 25 CaI.2d 353, 153 P.2d 746 (1944).
" 303 S.E.2d at 701.
82 Cook v. Duncan, 301 S.E.2d 837 (W. Va. 1983).
For a description of the process involved in perfecting title through a tax deed, see Don S.
Co., Inc. v. Roach, 285 S.E.2d 491 (W. Va. 1981).
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suance of the tax deed. The court's strict insistence on literal compliance
with all statutory requirements may give pause to some potential buyers at
tax sales who face an increasingly difficult and expensive task of perfecting
title, and who are subjected to a high degree of uncertainty as to the validity
of title for up to three years after purchase.92
Wendel B. Turner
W. VA. CODE § 11A-3-32 (1974) provides:
[Any person entitled to be notified ... may, on or before October thirty-first of the third




Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1984
